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Violence and the civilizing process: 
does it work? 
Pieter Spierenburg 
Among historians, especially those investigating violence, Norbert Elias ' 
theory of civilization has received divergent appreciations recently. In the 
Anglo-Saxon world, notably in North America, it has obtained increasing 
recognition over the last ten years or so. In particular, many authors agree 
that he offers the only theoretical framework which easily accomodates the 
empirical evidence on the long-term decline of homicide. Conversely, in 
Continental Europe during the 1990s, a number of historians, notably 
German historians of crime, have criticized Elias' work. In this discussion, 
too, the subject of violence looms large. 
This discussion article confronts the criticism levelled at the theory of 
civilization, in so far as it pertains to violence. It deals with four broad clus-
ters of problems : (1) the reliability and validity of the evidence for the long-
term trend of declining violence; (2) the character of violence, in particular 
its function as an indicator for the level of behavioral control; (3) the inter-
dependence of long-term change in the field of aggression and human emo-
tions on the one hand and the overall development of society on the other; (4) 
the new wave of interpersonal violence in the Western world in the late twen-
tieth century. 
It will be concluded that research on the long-term development of homi-
cide over the last twenty years has yielded impressive new evidence for the 
theory of civilization, which some historians nevertheless tend to ignore or 
attempt to explain away. The only objection to the theory not based on a mis-
interpretation refers to the historical study of honor and ritual. None of the 
data generated by this research, however, are incompatible with the 
processes first observed by Elias. Contrary to what his critics assume, the 
theory of civilization invites creative elaboration, which should be the aim of 
future research. 
Parmi les historiens, en particulier ceux qui s'intéressent à la violence, la 
théorie de la civilisation des mœurs de Norbert Elias a récemment fait l'objet 
d'appréciations divergentes. Dans le monde anglo-saxon, et en particulier en 
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Amérique du Nord, elle a connu une faveur croissante depuis une dizaine 
d'années. De nombreux auteurs admettent, en particulier, qu'elle constitue le 
seul cadre théorique qui soit compatible avec les preuves empiriques d'un 
déclin de l'homicide sur le long terme. Inversement, en Europe, plusieurs 
auteurs, notamment des historiens allemands de la criminalité, ont critiqué le 
travail d'Elias au cours des années 1990. Dans cette discussion également, la 
question de la violence occupe une part importante. 
Cet article discute les critiques adressées à la théorie de la civilisation 
des mœurs qui ont trait à la question de la violence. Il traite de quatre 
groupes de problèmes : (l)la fiabilité et la validité des données relatives à la 
tendance au déclin de la violence dans la longue durée; (2) le caractère de la 
violence et en particulier sa fonction d'indicateur du niveau de contrôle du 
comportement; (3) l'interdépendance entre, d'une part, le développement 
global de la société et, d'autre part, les changements dans le long terme dans 
le domaine de l'agressivité et des émotions; (4) la nouvelle vague de violence 
interpersonnelle dans le monde occidental de la fin du XXe siècle. 
On concluera que les recherches de ces vingt dernières années sur l'évo-
lution pluriséculaire de l'homicide ont apporté d'impressionnantes confir-
mations de la théorie de la civilisation des mœurs, que certains historiens 
tendent néanmoins à ignorer ou à contester. La seule objection qui ne soit pas 
basée sur une mésinterprétation de cette théorie réfère à l'approche his-
torique de l'honneur et des rites. Toutefois, aucune donnée produite par ces 
recherches n'est incompatible avec le processus observé pour la première 
fois par Elias. Contrairement à la position de ses critiques, la théorie de la 
civilisation des mœurs invite à la créativité scientifique, objectif qui devrait 
guider les recherches futures. 
Scholars who get excited by record-breaking figures must love the abbot Don Gregorio Salvini. In a book published in 1758 he refers to a survey, ostensi-
bly conducted by Corsica's Genoan overlords in 1715 : during the preceding thirty-
two years no less than 28 715 homicides had been committed on the island2. If true, 
this would yield a murder rate making the top figures cited most often in historical 
works - for fourteenth-century Florence and Oxford and a few mining towns on the 
American frontier - appear insignificant3. Moreover, the Corsican case definitely 
meets the methodological requirement of sufficient size (8 722 square km.) and evi-
dence over a sufficiently long time span. The island's population in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries has traditionally been estimated at 120 000, but in the most 
recent synthesis of its early modern history a figure of around 150 000 is assumed to 
be more realistic4. In the latter case, the homicide rate for the period 1683-1714 
comes at 598 per 100 000 inhabitants per year ; if we cling to the older population 
estimate, it would rise to 747, which, if anything else, is an appropriate number for 
a skyrocketing figure. 
Does the question, 747 or 598, really matter? Of course it would be unwise to 
take the surprisingly precise number of homicides reported by Salvini for granted, 
2
 Salvini (1758, p. 80). I am indebted to prof. Antoine-Marie Graziani for directing me to this work, 
which is the (only) original source for all discussions of the figure in question in historical literature. 
3
 Becker (1976, p. 287); the figures of pp. 152 and 68 for Florence both refer to a period of only 4 
years, so they should be averaged to 110; Hammer (1978, p. 11); Courtwright (1996, p. 82). 
4
 Arrighi ed. (1971, p. 276); Graziani (1997, p. 89). 
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even though the abbot claimed he had it from a governmental document. The 
avowed purpose of his book was to expose the failures of the Genoese administra-
tion in Corsica, in this case the regime's fomentation of «civil discord». We can 
discard his revolutionary bias, of course, if he had correctly taken the number in 
question from an administrative document (which we do not know)5. Even then, it is 
unlikely that the reported figure of 28 715 homicides was based on a thorough and 
reliable investigation. In 1715, the Genoese administration itself had every reason to 
exaggerate. It had just instituted a tax on the possession of firearms in Corsica, in an 
attempt to pacify the island. For this reason, the leading historian of early modern 
Corsica, Antoine-Marie Graziani, considers the figure in question completely mean-
ingless6. 
Nonetheless, whatever the degree of exaggeration, Corsica around 1700 was by 
no means a peaceful place. Salvini's claim that it was all Genoa's fault, does not 
diminish the reality of social conflict. Graziani himself speaks of an «extreme 
degree of violence » pervading early modern Corsican society. Priests, too, walked 
around armed, even in church, and they avenged their family honor by killing 
members of enemy factions. The number of bandits was kept in check only because 
many of them decided to try their luck in Sardinia or the mainland7. Moreover, blood 
feuds and banditry still were endemic in Corsica during most of the nineteenth 
century, as evidenced by Stephen Wilson's well-known study. Wilson has calculated 
homicide rates ranging between 26 and 64 per 100,000 inhabitants (annual averages 
in five-year periods) during the years 1816-18508. There is no reason to assume a 
priori that they were lower in the early modern period. Indeed, another contempo-
rary, Ajaccio's bishop Giustiniani, wrote in 1604 that, during his seventeen years of 
office, he had personally witnessed the killing of at least a hundred men. This would 
imply an annual homicide rate for the town of Ajaccio - one more exaggeration, no 
doubt - of over 294 per 100 000 9. During a large part of its history, then, the inhab-
itants of Corsica were decidedly more violent, on average, than their contemporaries 
in mainstream Europe. 
The case of Corsica highlights the exceptions and discontinuities which marked 
the development of interpersonal violence in Europe. There was no unilinear and 
universal evolution from a violent to a less violent society. Norbert Elias' theory of 
civilization, some scholars believe, implies just such an evolution. That sort of sim-
plistic interpretation of his theory can easily be corrected10. Other criticisms, 
however, may prove a little harder to handle. The purpose of this essay is to re-assess 
s
 I was unable to trace such a document during a brief visit to the Archivio di Stato in Genoa. I am 
grateful to its director, dr. Carlo Bitossi, for his help. 
6
 E-mail correspondence between myself and prof. Graziani, July-November 2000. 
7
 Graziani (1993 & 1997, pp. 146-174) (quote on p. 166). The involvement of priests casts doubt on 
Wilson's thesis that feuds increased in severity in the 19th century, because of a growing disrespect 
for mitigating rules such as the immunity of certain categories of persons, among whom priests 
(Wilson, 1988, pp. 53-54,207). 
8
 Wilson (1988, p. 16). 
9
 Giustiniani cited in Graziani (1997, pp. 166-167). Ajaccio had about 2 000 inhabitants at the begin-
ning of the 17th century (p. 105). 
1 0
 This theory was first outlined in (Elias, 1939), but I will emphasize the unity of his entire work and 
the contribution to his theory by other scholars. 
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the explanatory value of the theory of civilization in the light of historical data on 
interpersonal violence. That effort includes a response to some of Elias' critics. 
Among historians, especially those investigating violence, the theory of civiliza-
tion has received divergent appreciations recently. In the Anglo-Saxon world, 
notably in North America, it has obtained increasing recognition over the last ten 
years or so. In particular, the growing interest in the subject of the long-term devel-
opment of homicide has put Elias' work on the scholarly agenda. Most authors agree 
that he offers the only theoretical framework which easily accomodates the empiri-
cal evidence on the long-term decline of homicide1 1. It must be added that the 
authors in question are mostly content with making this observation and undertake 
little effort to elaborate on Elias' analysis. Conversely, in Continental Europe during 
the 1990s, a number of historians have criticized Elias' work. Some medievalists, 
for example, argue that he presents a distorted picture of life in the middle ages. In 
this discussion, too, the subject of violence looms large. Among German crime his-
torians it now has become almost commonplace to reject the theory of civilization. 
It is less clear, though, what they propose in its place. 
The criticism from Continental scholars varies in its degree of sophistication. 
Some of it is rather superficial. In a collective volume entitled Kulturen der Gewalt, 
for example, several contributors, though not all, implicitly or explicitly argue 
against Elias. In the introduction, Rolf Peter Sieferle plays the trick of associating 
Elias with Hobbes and calls the former's theory a simple, linear narrative, which it 
indeed is in Sieferle's « summary » 1 2 . Martin Dinges attempts to confront the theory 
of civilization head-on, an effort which utterly fails because he is only fighting the 
windmills of his own bizarre caricature. For example, Dinges claims that Elias 
stresses the «otherness» and strangeness of violence, relegating it to the realm of 
«cultural deserts » 1 3 . Although totally unfounded, this objection is intriguing 
because it forms the exact opposite of the reproach made by some medievalists : that 
Elias considers violence as a normal and omnipresent feature of medieval life. By 
contrast, a recent article by Gerd Schwerhoff offers a more sophisticated critique of 
the theory of civilization. Schwerhoff is aware that this theory concerns more than 
just violence and provides an almost impeccable summary. In the end, however, his 
essay betrays a structural bias : he cites a number of - mostly historical - studies 
published since 1939 which (appear to) contradict what Elias wrote, but he omits the 
numerous studies published since then which confirm his theory1 4. Most of the 
objections raised by Dinges and Schwerhoff will be dealt with below. 
An author is always well-advised if he controls his own passions, so I must 
refrain from a too-detailed refutation of the arguments of every scholar I disagree 
with. For the sake of systematization, let me group the objections levelled against 
the theory of civilization, in so far as they pertain to violence, into four broad clus-
ters : (1) the reliability and validity of the evidence for the long-term trend of declin-
1 1
 Gurr (1981, pp. 341-342) was probably the first. More recently in the editors' introduction to 
Johnson, Monkkonen (1996). 
1 2
 Sieferle in Sieferle, Breuninger (1998, pp. 9-29; here pp. 14-15). The counter-example in this volume 
is Cristoph Marx's article on South-Africa (pp. 215-240) which makes creative use of Elias' theory. 
1 3
 Dinges in Sieferle, Breuninger (1998, pp. 171-194; esp. pp. 176-178). In a similar vein, Ariette Farge 
claims that Elias is silent about «l'intérieur de la violence, les formes de ce phénomène qui relèvent 
de la rationalité» (Burguière et al., 1995, p. 224). 
1 4
 Schwerhoff (1998). Summary of Elias on pp. 568-573. 
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ing violence; (2) the character of violence, in particular its function as an indicator 
for the level of behavioral control; (3) the interdependence of long-term change in 
the field of aggression and human emotions on the one hand and the overall devel-
opment of society on the other ; (4) the new wave of interpersonal violence in the 
Western world in the late twentieth century. At several points in my discussion it will 
be necessary to clear up misunderstandings, for which I apologize in advance. It 
actually testifies to the strength of the theory of civilization that its persistent critics 
have only been able to present a seemingly plausible argument by misrepresenting 
it. 
Was the long-term decline of violence, from the fourteenth century to the middle 
of the twentieth, real? Obviously, this is a methodological problem of concern to all 
researchers in the field, whether or not they accept the theory of civilization. Most 
of them do agree that the quantitative evidence on homicide points at a real decrease 
in the amount of killing. By contrast, in their enthusiasm for piling up one criticism 
of Elias on the other, both Schwerhoff and Dinges question this widely shared view. 
The first even proposes to reconsider the common habit of treating homicide figures 
based on prosecuted cases alone as suspect. «The widespread practice of consider-
ing the highest available rates as those nearest to reality » he says, «has a certain 
arbitrariness to it» 1 5 . 
Why not take low rates for real for a change, this statement implies. In fact, no 
researcher, whether following Elias or not, advocates a method of always accepting 
the highest figures reported. For example, if a ninth-century chronicler writes mat a 
thousand Vikings attacked his town, the historian takes this number cum grano salis. 
I just did the same with the amount of murders claimed by Salvini and we should do 
this in all similar cases. The real criterion is not the highest but the best estimate. For 
that reason, demographic historians regularly reject reported population figures as 
either too high or too low. It just happens that, for homicide, body inspections are 
our best measure, especially before the age of statistics and journalism. Conversely, 
figures for prosecuted homicide do not always yield the lowest rates. In modern 
times they often include attempts, yielding figures much above those derived from 
contemporary medical statistics. 
Ongoing work by Manuel Eisner represents the most exhaustive effort of col-
lecting data, from a host of scattered publications, on homicide figures from the 
European past16. Even his data base, I think, occasionally underestimates the 
number of murders. Notably, Eisner has included a few older studies of places in late 
medieval and early modern England which are based on indictments alone. As I 
have argued earlier, Gurr's original graph for England starts off at a too modest 
level 1 7. Moreover, the incredibly low homicide rates (around 0.7) in Swedish 
national statistics beginning in the mid-eighteenth century are doubly inflated : not 
only are they probably based on court cases (Osterberg does not specify this), they 
are relative to the number of inhabitants aged 15-69 1 8. Correction for the latter factor 
1 5
 Schwerhoff (1999, p. 119). 
1 6
 Reported in Eisner (2000, conference paper). To appear in British Journal of Criminology, 2001/4. 
1 7
 Spierenburg in Johnson, Monkkonen (1996, pp. 65, 95). This argument gets support from Roth's 
analysis (this issue). 
1 8
 Österberg in Johnson, Monkkonen (1996, pp. 43-44). Neither does she discuss the source for the 
national statistics in earlier publications where she uses them. 
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would at least bring them near to one. Despite these considerations, Eisner's con-
clusion on the long-term trend in Europe is inescapable: «the evidence is so consis-
tent, the secular decline so regular and the differences in levels so large, that it seems 
difficult to refute the conclusion of a real and notable decline » 1 9 . 
It is one thing to observe a decreasing trend in homicide, it is another to conclude 
that violence in general has declined. Although several scholars feel unhappy with 
this extrapolation, only Dinges, to my knowledge, has maintained that the level of 
nonlethal violence actually has increased. The basis for this is very meager : a few 
French studies show a rise in prosecutions for violent offenses toward the end of the 
eighteenth century and studies of marital conflict reveal a lot of battering and assault 
within families in the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth20. The 
latter observation says nothing about the prevalence of domestic fights in an earlier 
or later period. Moreover, one of Dinges' sources, David Sabean, actually observes 
a shift from « systematic » to « reactive » violence by husbands around 1800, which 
rather suggests a decline in overall marital violence 2 1. The question of husbands 
beating their wives has been heavily debated among family historians. Although 
they disagree over the timing of change, most agree on a declining trend somewhere 
between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries. The trajectories of this trend in 
various countries should of course be established with greater precision, but for the 
moment we observe that its direction is congruent with the overall development 
regarding interpersonal violence. 
To be sure, high levels of homicide are usually due to a prevalence of male-on-
male fighting. We are justified in taking these homicides as indicators for a broader 
reservoir of violence, because they commonly are «accidents», cases in which a 
fight got out of hand2 2. Accepting this, one might still argue that, if men's aggressive 
impulses become stronger, both their willingness to attack others increases and the 
proportion of fights with an « accidental», lethal outcome. The consequence, for the 
sake of argument, can be stated in quantitative terms : in order to prove a doubling 
of men's aggressive impulses over a certain period, we need a quadrupling of homi-
cides and to substantiate a 50% decline, a division by a factor of four is needed. 
Obviously, with a long-term trend of several dozens to under one, this is no problem. 
Quantification alone never tells the whole story. No one would argue that non-
lethal violence, including mere threatening, should be left from consideration by 
historians, or that the study of assault and fighting produces only trivial knowledge. 
It just happens to be the case that, to establish the sheer amount of violence in a 
society, homicide rates are our only reliable indicator23. With just the rates of prose-
cution available, increases or decreases in nonlethal violence may reflect anything. 
In other words, although fights, assaults and threats constitute a subject highly worth 
1 9
 Eisner (2000, p. 11). 
2 0
 Dinges in Sieferle, Breuninger (1998, pp. 175,186). 
2 1
 Sabean (1990, pp. 133-134). 
2 2
 I discussed this more elaborately in my contribution to Johnson, Monkkonen (1996, p. 74). I found 
no counter-argument in more recent literature. 
2 3
 The only other possibility is when some town or region obliged its surgeons to report the violently 
inflicted wounds they treated and a complete series of reports has survived. I have found no study in 
which these two requirements were met, but the preliminary one by Bartolini (1999) points in that 
direction. 
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studying, any count of them is unable to prove or disprove the long-term decline in 
violence. Informed estimates based on prosecuted rates are of course possible. Two 
English studies, by Beattie for the eighteenth century and Gatrell for the second half 
of the nineteenth, are generally acclaimed for the sophistication of their quantitative 
analysis. The authors carefully weighed all possible factors influencing their 
figures, which enabled them to extrapolate convincingly from prosecuted rates of 
nonlethal assault to real rates. Both authors conclude toward a decline of violence 2 4. 
A final point in this cluster of problems concerns the population side of calculat-
ing homicide rates. In his dissertation, not that critical of the dominant method yet, 
Schwerhoff already expressed some doubt: in modern times, even a «sleepy 
provincial town» easily assembles 50 000 people within its confines2 5. The implica-
tion is that the twentieth century's low homicide rates are biased because of the 
«unfairly high numbers» of inhabitants. One could easily turn this argument 
around : people living in 1500 would find it amazing that a town of that size can be 
sleepy. The question is what do you want your homicide rates to speak for. One 
important thing they testify to, I argue, is contemporaries' direct experience with 
violence. If a town of 5 000 inhabitants witnesses three murders per year, it means 
that every neighborhood community has first-hand experience with killing. Today, 
not to mention in the 1950s, many neighborhood communities have no direct expe-
rience with killing at all. Their members live in a world in which aggressive emo-
tions are kept in check to a large extent. Viewed from that angle, it is equally 
unnecessary to control homicide rates for such factors as the proportion of young 
men in the population. This factor can simply figure among the explanations for 
regional and short-term variations in the rates. Whatever the age structure, it leaves 
the bare fact of the total population's experience with violence unaltered. Whereas it 
is true that in every society we know of violence is practiced disproportionately by 
young males, practice alone does not tell us much about an entire community's atti-
tude. During a feud, for example, older men, or women for that matter, may encour-
age youths to avenge the family honor26. 
The subject of honor smoothly leads to my second theme, that of the character 
and context of violence. This is a contested area, in particular for the period when 
homicide rates were high : the middle ages. Incidentally, in my opinion «middle 
ages» is a misleading and useless term, which should be banned from historical 
writing. In our discussion, the term essentially refers to (the urban world of) the late 
thirteenth through early sixteenth centuries. For brevity's sake, despite my reserva-
tions, I will refer to this period as «the middle ages ». 
Apart from indulging in fights, this was also a time in which people ate with their 
hands, urinated in public, bathed naked and shared beds with complete strangers. 
According to the theory of civilization, the degree of control over affects and 
impulses was lower and sudden shifts from one mood to another occurred more fre-
quently than in later periods. Note the comparative wording here. Lesser control is 
not the same as no control. Elias always emphasized that processes of civilization 
2 4
 Gatrell (1980); Beattie (1986). 
2 5
 Schwerhoff (1991, p. 286). 
2 6
 Among Turks in the Netherlands today, families often require adolescents, who cannot be tried as 
adults, to kill for honor. See van Eck (2001). 
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have no beginning : in any society people control their emotions to some degree. 
Moreover, the relatively low level of emotional control prevailing in the middle ages 
was just as much a habitus which had to be learned, into which the young had to be 
socialized, as the court etiquette of Versailles. Given this, it is certainly unjustified 
that some historians continue to write as if Elias viewed medieval life in terms of a 
static «we-they» contrast. Any criticism based on the mistaken notion that Elias 
postulated a zero point of civilization can simply be dismissed. 
Passages coming near to this view can nevertheless be found in the historical lit-
erature on violence. Thus, the French medievalist Claude Gauvard chides Elias for 
having observed in the middle ages nothing but an «instinctive and brutal barbar-
ity » 2 7 . German historians followed suit: in line with Huizinga, he has painted a 
naive picture of quickly changing moods 2 8; he succumbed to «the myth of the wild 
and dark middle ages » 2 9 . Taking issue with his use of the famous Hausbuch as a 
source of information about knightly life, Schwerhoff once more overstates his 
point. Modern investigators have shown that various artists worked on the 
Hausbuch and that several patrons fostered it, Schwerhoff triumphantly remarks, as 
if this would not rather raise its value as an illustration of contemporary customs3 0. 
Finally, in an amusing note, Valentin Groebner gave the reproach of a naive view of 
the middle ages a new twist : Elias actually loved the middle ages. It is no coinci-
dence, Groebner says, that he described the untamed lust for violence in what this 
historian considers « sexually loaded terms ». Whether Elias wrote about fighting or 
love-making, it all sprang from « a nostalgia for a lost intensity and authenticity of 
feelings » 3 1 . 
Groebner's statement is amusing, because he apparently thinks he has made a 
« discovery ». It is irrelevant to the theory of civilization, however, whether someone 
thinks its author was seized by a nostalgic longing or a stomach ache when contem-
plating medieval life. Such comments tell us more about the personality of the 
scholars who make them than about the theory they ostensibly criticize. Historians 
like Groebner suppose there simply must be a personal value judgment in Elias' 
work; they are unable to accept his main motive was to interpret the sources. By 
contrast, in a more realistic approach, the observer may acknowledge that one and 
the same historical process can involve elements which an individual possibly likes 
as well as those he possibly dislikes : gains and losses, if you wish. Thus, we might 
say that civilizing processes imply both an increase in politeness and a decrease in 
spontaneity. 
The criticism discussed so far is largely devoid of content. The only serious 
objection which does refer to a matter of content, concerns the twin themes of ritual 
and honor. The ritualization of violence and its embeddedness in an honor code, a 
number of scholars claim, belie Elias' picture of medieval life as relatively free from 
emotional controls. Again, Gauvard was one of the first to present this argument, but 
she merely posits it in the introduction and conclusion of her voluminous study. 
Honor, she explains, was a value shared by all social classes. The fact that violent 
2 7
 Gauvard(1991,p.944). 
2 8
 Schuster (1995, pp. 96-98). 
2 9
 Schwerhoff (1998, 601). Similar in Schwerhoff (1999, p. 121). 
3 0
 Schwerhoff (1998, p. 579). 
3 1
 Groebner (1995, p. 165). 
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behavior was usually bound to the rules of the honor code means that affects were 
constrained after all, hence a considerable blow to the theory of civilization. 
Gauvard does not illustrate this with concrete examples though. Another weak point 
concerns her continuous confusion between violence and criminality in general : 
low crime rates automatically translate into a low level of violence. Finally, she 
writes as if society is a person who acts, even producing the curious sentence 
« society has made rules to protect itself against itself » 3 2 . 
Arguing in a similar vein, Schuster introduces a concrete example, an incident in 
fifteenth-century Basel : everything is peaceful on the fish market in the early 
evening; a few words from a passer-by alter the situation; suddenly two people are 
fighting with knives. Then Schuster reveals that the incident had a previous history : 
the two fighters had quarrelled the other day and the passer-by knew he was likely 
to encounter his opponent again on the fish market. This kind of purposeful action, 
Schuster continues, was typical of medieval conflicts. He considers the fact that 
third parties often tried to stop a fight as another argument against Elias' theory33. 
One wonders why Schuster did not begin his story with the incident of the other day 
and whether the angry man perhaps had decided in an impulse to walk to the fish 
market. This example merely illustrates that some conflicts lasted for a longer time, 
a fact which Elias knew all too well of course. We have no proof yet that honor and 
ritual were incompatible with free-floating emotions. 
In this matter, Dinges presents the most ingenious argument. According to him, 
honor and ritual functioned as pacifying factors : «The most important consequence 
of the ritualization of violence is the opportunity [it offers] to get out of a violent 
confrontation and peacefully concede to the demands of the other party». 
Consequently, ritual is a zweckrational phenomenon34. Dinges bases this explicit 
conclusion on the more implicit ones in his book on conflict in eighteenth-century 
Paris. In that perceptive study he shows that even the seemingly most trivial behav-
ior of common people acquires meaning within the context of honor games. Every 
action has its symbolic significance; nothing is just random. A confrontation may 
end in bloodshed or go no further than verbal threats, but rituals accompany it at 
every stage. Based on the evidence, Dinges constructs an ideal-type scenario of a 
slowly escalating quarrel. Verbal threats are followed by gestures : «In these care-
fully ordered gestures, we note again their precisely calculated, ritualized character 
of threatening » 3 5 . 
His choice of words is revealing. Ritual involves calculation, Dinges implies, 
and therefore affect control. If one of his Parisians struck another with his fist, this 
was part of a scenario which the attacker had planned, as it were, five days earlier 
and had tested and refined in his thoughts. Here we have Dinges' fundamental 
mistake. The repetitive nature of his scenario does not point at planning or calcula-
tion. Ritual implies a fixed pattern! That pattern is already in people's heads; it does 
not have to be invented. Consequently, the ritual character of many violent con-
frontations does not preclude that they arose out of impulse. This applies with equal 
3 2
 Gauvard (1991; paraphrased quote on p. 700). See also Gauvard (1993). 
3 3
 Schuster (1995, pp. 98-104). The book actually is about Konstanz, but apparently he needed an 
excursus to Basel to find the right example. 
3 4
 Dinges in Sieferle, Breuninger (1998, pp. 178 (quote), 180). 
3 5
 Dinges (1994, p. 337). 
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force to the medieval period. All human behavior, also in societies with low levels 
of affect control, depends to a high degree upon prior learning36. To get angry and 
aggressive, you first need a reason, however suddenly found. You have to differen-
tiate situations with a friendly atmosphere from situations of hostility. In almost 
every society, people who attack and kill for no apparent reason have been consid-
ered mad. The caricature which some historians paint of Elias' view of the middle 
ages is that of a society of madmen. 
Moreover, Dinges' argument that ritual facilitates the peaceful resolution of a 
conflict before it escalates, even if it were true, is besides the point. To facilitate is 
not to guarantee automatically. Recurrently, the adherence to ritual failed to prevent 
bloodshed, in Gauvard's middle ages no less than in Dinges' eighteenth century. The 
homicide rates suggest this happened more frequently in the former period. Dinges 
only proves (although this is important in itself) that a lot of minor violence in eigh-
teenth-century Paris still was highly ritualized. It should be added that he concen-
trated on cases involving honor. What about the violence used in robberies, for 
example; did it have a more instrumental character? Also, in the absence of a reli-
able indicator for the quantitative incidence of assaults and fights («real crime»), 
we are ignorant how the sheer number of the cases studied relates to that in earlier 
and later periods : in Paris, in France, in the rest of Europe. 
Taken together, the criticisms from Dinges and the medievalists want to have it 
both ways. If they can't disprove the theory of civilization on quantitative grounds, 
because of high levels of violence in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, they 
point at ritual and argue that attackers actually displayed a great amount of self-
control. If they cannot find much ritual, as in nineteenth-century Europe, they claim 
quantitatively high levels of assault and marital abuse, as we saw, no longer bother-
ing about the question whether this involved controlled violence. 
If the practice of ritual and an attachment to one's honor are compatible with 
free-floating emotions, the study of these themes can be integrated into the theory of 
civilization. A host of recent studies have shown the prevalence of honorific vio-
lence in the rural and urban communities of preindustrial Europe. For some histori-
ans, the popularity of this subject is sufficient reason to consider Elias' approach 
antequated37. However, the novelty of a theme says nothing about its implication for 
existing theories. In an attempt to endow these modern studies with a common 
program, Schwerhoff calls them microhistories, in which violence is analyzed « as 
part of an old European culture of conflict and struggle » 3 8 . Apart from the fact that 
this formula smacks a bit too much of old German Volkskunde, he simply provides 
no alternative theory. The microhistories have supplied us with a mass of empirical 
data, showing that, at different times and places, violent confrontations were cases 
of a defense of a person's honor. The task before us now is to explore new roads 
leading toward insights transcending this purely empirical observation. In that task, 
the theory of civilization still is a formidable base from which to proceed. 
3 6
 Compare Elias (1991). 
3 7
 Compare Roodenburg, who opposes Elias' approach to an unspecified «modern cultural history» 
(review of Johnson, Monkkonen in CHS, 2000 ,4 ,1 , p. 137). To be sure, Elias dealt with the concept 
of honor in his discussion of dueling in Elias (1992). 
3 8
 Schwerhoff(1999,p. 121). 
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The present author has made a modest attempt in this direction. First, I postu-
lated that impulsive vs planned violence and ritual vs instrumental violence were the 
end poles of two largely independent axes 3 9. This notion of axes has proved useful 
in a study of modern Brazil4 0. Second, I pointed at changes in the concept of honor 
over the last few centuries, which loosened its connection to violence 4 1. In the 
absence of serious rebuttals, I can simply refer to this earlier work. 
It may leave one problem unsolved : killing within the context of a feud fre-
quently has an intentional ring to it (although the original murder triggering a feud 
often has an impulsive character). That is obvious, for example, in cases in which an 
enemy is ambushed. Such cases appear to contradict the idea of a long-term trend 
from impulsive to planned violence. Possibly, my axes are valid only for post-feud 
phases of social development. Alternatively, we may still acknowledge a certain 
impulsive element in feuds, to the extent that the timing of an incident can be unex-
pected, or in view of the often arbitrary choice of which member of a hostile family 
or faction to attack. We may also see it in the passion with which bloodshed may 
follow upon bloodshed in long-lasting vendettas, or even in sudden changes of 
mood from enmity to forgiveness, sealed by a reconciliation ritual, which Elias con-
siders as typical for the society in question. Moreover, the practice of feuding 
usually involves a love of slaughter and the association of human enemies to a 
hunting prey, an attitude magisterially described by Edward Muir4 2. There is suffi-
cient reason, then, to rank the physical attacks and killings occasioned by feuds 
closer to the impulsive than to the planned pole. 
The third cluster of problems, the interdependence of long-term change in the 
field of aggression and human emotions on the one hand and the overall develop-
ment of society on the other, touches on the very core of the theory of civilization. In 
this domain, too, misinterpretations have clouded the discussion at times. According 
to one incorrect view, Elias' theory simply postulates a long-term decline of vio-
lence in every social domain. If physical punishment, for example, was on the rise 
in the sixteenth century compared to the preceding period, this would constitute a 
problem43. However, the death penalties of the sixteenth century primarily were a 
function of the growth and stabilization of state monopolies. These judicial execu-
tions should rather be put on a par with the feuds by which social control and regu-
lation were achieved previously. With the growth and stabilization of state 
monopolies, the paradoxical situation emerged of a combination of collective vio-
lence directed outward and a relative pacification of social relations, with law 
enforcement as an exception, inside4 4. 
Linguistic peculiarities have caused some confusion in this respect. The term 
« monopoly of violence », commonly used in English, is actually misleading. First, 
3 9
 Spierenburg in Johnson, Monkkonen (1996, pp. 70-71). 
4 0
 Souza(1999). 
41
 Cf. my contributions, notably the introduction, to Spierenburg (1998). 
4 2
 Muir (1993). 
4 3
 See, for example, the review of De Verbroken Betovering by Florike Egmond in NRC-Handelsblad, 
March 5, 1999. 
44
 Cf. Goudsblom (1998). Roché is one more author who notes this (speaking of most of the 20th 
century) : « On ne peut pas dire que le monde est plus pacifique et moins violent comme un tout. 
Simplement, les relations interindividuelles étaient plus pacifiques...» (1998, p. 2, note 1). 
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the monopoly is always relative, since the very assaults and killings discussed here 
imply an encroachment on it. Second, following Weber, Elias spoke of a 
Gewaltmonopol; the German word Gewalt originally connoted something like 
« ability to rule» 4 5. Although this obviously has to do with power, it is incorrect to 
say « monopoly of power». Elias emphasized that power is an aspect of all social 
relationships; that it is always two-sided. Although the power balance between 
those who rule and those who are ruled is unequal, the latter have a measure of 
power too. Thus, by definition, power can never be monopolized. My proposal is to 
translate Gewaltmonopol as «military monopoly». As Elias demonstrated, its 
gradual formation was intertwined with that of a monopoly on levying taxes. These 
two aspects, military ascendency and taxation, together made up the state monopoly, 
a number of which were established in Europe during the early modern period. 
Within the theory of civilization this is a crucial, but by no means the only social 
development which facilitated changes in behavioral standards. 
To denote these changes in behavioral standards in English, the term « civilizing 
process » is common, whereas «process of civilization» actually would be better. 
The former term suggests that a person or group out there is actively civilizing 
others, which, in its turn, might suggest that social processes come about because 
someone directs them. That is never the case. Long-term processes, also that of civ-
ilization, are largely «blind». Thus, the refinement of manners in early modern 
France received an impetus because middle groups imitated the court elite, where-
upon the latter were forced to revise their manners in order to maintain social dis-
tinction. On the other hand, throughout history some people have tried indeed to 
change the behavior of others, often in the direction of «more civilized » standards. 
If this effort involves a more or less concerted campaign, we may speak of a civi-
lization offensive. The «invention of modern man», as Muchembled calls it, in fact 
represented a major offensive of this type. During a period stretching from the late 
sixteenth century to the middle of the eighteenth, we frequently observe concerted 
efforts, through courts and other agencies, to impose norms and standards of behav-
ior implying a more sober way of life, a decrease of magic in people's world view, a 
more controlled sexuality, etc. 4 6. The word offensive, of course, does not necessar-
ily imply success. Like similar ones, this concerted campaign itself was part of a 
more encompassing, blind process. For example, if the behavior of peasants in 1800 
differed from that in 1500, this was not merely due to the offensives of courts and 
moral entrepreneurs, but it was also facilitated by social and economic transforma-
tions. Both the imitation-and-refinement mechanism and that of conscious inculca-
tion of norms in their turn formed part of overall blind changes. 
Thus, the various interdependencies - such as the intertwinement of the growth 
of state monopolies and the spread of «civilized» codes of behavior - were of a 
4 5
 I already discussed this in the introduction of my dissertation (Spierenburg, 1978). Today, German 
historians freely use «Gewalt» with reference to interpersonal violence. Dinges, however, appears to 
draw on the older connotation of Gewalt, when he unjustly accuses me of overlooking state violence 
(in Sieferle, Breuninger, 1998, p. 173). A comparable terminological confusion is evident in a debate 
among French historians on Elias (Burguière et al, 1995). In that debate, Chartier's definition of 
interpersonal violence « comme mise en jeu des corps pouvant amener la mise en jeu de l'existence» 
(p. 231) is well-taken. For his part, Elias hardly used the word violence; to denote affects of aggres-
sion, he spoke of «Angriffslust». 
4 6
 Muchembled (1988). It should be noted that the singular abstract of «modern man» is quite unlike 
Elias' approach. 
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complex nature. Moreover, these interdependent developments were structured dif-
ferently in various parts of Europe. Still another mistaken view is that Elias 
somehow considered court society - and the French model at that - as a necessary 
stage, without which the process of civilization is unthinkable47. Admittedly, he con-
centrated on France in his 1939 book and published a separate study of the French 
court. But once more, it is unfair to evaluate his contribution to les sciences 
humaines based only on these two books. Elias later wrote about quite different 
social formations and other scholars have done so, using his approach. He always 
called for new research, which might lead to modificatons of his theory. The appro-
priate reaction, therefore, is to take up that challenge, rather than simply reproach-
ing Elias for not having done all the work himself. 
When we acknowledge that the road through court society was not necessarily 
the only route for civilization processes, there is no particular reason why we should 
expect to find that countries or territories with an absolutist regime first witnessed 
the decline of homicide4 8. To the contrary, they are more likely to have been slower 
in this respect. As Elias himself pointed out, the recently «tamed » court aristocrats 
of Louis XIV still carried swords and their renunciation of violence was based on 
Fremdzwang (external constraints) rather than Selbstzwang (automatic self-con-
straint). In this environment, the etiquette of table manners and polite conversation, 
rather than the curbing of anger, formed the main arena for changes in behavioral 
codes. This is far from an anomaly, since the theory of civilization is about overall 
societal change, stressing the interdependence of macro-psychological and social, 
or inter-human, processes. On the most general level, Elias identifies processes of 
differentiation of functions and extension of the chains of interdependence49. These 
include urbanization, for example, or economic differentiation, which might equally 
have affected specific spurts in the long-term trend of declining violence. 
We are of course seriously handicapped, if we want to find out how the coming 
of court society affected interpersonal violence in France. The utter lack of French 
homicide rates for the pre-statistical period makes this enterprise nearly impossible. 
It is the nefarious legacy of the violence au vol thesis, which has given rise to a fatal 
preoccupation with percentages. Almost every French historian appears to be con-
vinced that determining the ratio of (prosecuted) violent offenses to property 
offenses is the real thing. Consequently, France is a blank spot on the European chart 
of the long-term development of homicide. To remedy that situation is one of the 
principal requirements for furthering our understanding of interpersonal violence in 
the past. 
Finally, the present. How does the new wave of interpersonal violence in the 
Western world in the late twentieth century relate to the theory of civilization? For 
4 7
 Even while acknowledging that Elias stressed the different routes taken by England and Germany, 
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a non-French court deviated from Versailles as a refutation of Elias' theory. Moreover, it eludes me 
why « communication between ruler and leading elite » and « patronage exchange » are incompatible 
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1OO PIETER SPIERENBURG 
those who think this theory is evolutionistic or teleological, the answer is simple. 
The accusation of evolutionism, however, can be ignored, since it is based on the 
unscholarly procedure of apportioning guilt by association : Elias' work is first pro-
nounced akin to nineteenth-century theories and next every shortcoming of these 
theories is held against him as well 5 0. The theory of civilization is of course based on 
observed past trends and has no room for evolution. Future generations may witness 
social integration at even higher levels than the state or they may not. 
To illuminate the present, we have to turn to the distant past for a moment. The 
theory of civilization essentially maintains that a few general societal developments 
roughly march together: toward increasing differentiation of functions and an 
extension of the chains of interdependence or in the opposite direction. There are 
sufficient examples of sustained de-integration in the past, of which the decline and 
fall of the Roman Empire in the West is probably the best known case. The break-
down of the Roman state monopoly and the concomitant de-differentiation of func-
tions were accompanied in their turn by a decrease in average affect control. There 
are enough indications to maintain that, during the Principate, the Roman elites had 
a measure of sensitivity and «civilized' emotional control roughly similar to that 
prevailing among the aristocracy and higher bourgeoisie of France or England 
around 1700. If we could get homicide rates for Europe South of the Rhine and 
Danube in the first five centuries of the Common Era, the theory of civilization 
expects them to be lowest in the first and second centuries and then start on a secular 
rise, along with the breakdown of central state control and economic de-differentia-
tion. 
The example of Corsica, with which I began, forms another case in point. 
Neither the Genoan city-state nor the French national state during the first century 
of its hegemony could exercise an effective military monopoly over the island, 
while the level of economic integration and urbanization remained ephemeral 
during this period. The corollary was a persistence of high levels of interpersonal 
violence 5 1. A recent, more short-term example concerns the devolution of the Soviet 
Union. In this case, a weakening of the state monopoly is accompanied by rising 
homicide rates. What happened in Corsica and the former Soviet Union, is precisely 
what the theory of civilization would lead us to expect. In a similar vein, the increase 
in interpersonal violence in the Western world from the 1970s through 1990s was 
partly due to the emergence of unpacified islands in the inner cities 5 2. 
Nevertheless, the very long-term, or world-historical trend rather proceeds in the 
opposite direction. Periods of de-differentiation and de-civilization have usually 
been followed by renewed integration. The world-historical trend lends some plau-
sibility to the expectation of integration at a higher level somewhere in the future. 
Far from involving wishful, evolutionary thinking, this is a realistic prospect (and it 
is per definition not wishful for those who hate the idea). In the long run, societies 
with greater integration and affect control tend to prevail over societies with lesser 
integration and affect control. This is not due to the presence of some Hegelian 
5 0
 Recently, Schwerhoff (1998, p. 595) used this procedure. Thome (this issue) also speaks of an evo-
lutionary component. 
5 1
 A similar situation prevailed in Sicily. Cf. Blok (1974), who, however, does not provide homicide 
rates. 
52
 Cf. Spierenburg in Johnson, Monkkonen (1996, p. 95). This argument was first put forward (implic-
itly) in Anderson (1994). 
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world spirit or because someone planned it in advance; it is our empirical observa-
tion in retrospect. 
Even if we expect renewed integration and civilization in the future, we are igno-
rant about its timing. Are we to assume, with Thome in this issue, that the trend 
toward rising interpersonal violence will be with us for a while? That is a mere pre-
diction of course. One cannot explain a predicted trend, only make the prediction 
plausible. A minor argument against its plausibility is the slight decrease in the 
homicide rate observed in the USA at the closing of the 1990s. An argument for the 
stability of the trend observed since the 1970s, on the other hand, is that it appears to 
be accompanied by the «revival» of a traditional notion of male honor. For a full 
appreciation of modern developments, however, a more distant past needs to be 
taken into consideration. 
One longer-term trend has remained undeflected in Western societies until the 
present day, despite the recent increase in the homicide rate. I am referring to the 
pacification of the elites. Well into the seventeenth century it had been common for 
aristocrats and rich burghers to engage personally in physical struggles. This has 
become ever more uncommon for them since, with the revival of dueling among the 
nineteenth-century bourgeoisie as a partial exception5 3. Throughout the twentieth 
century, the West's upper and middle classes have largely refrained from fighting in 
daily life, considering this a negative habit of men from the lower classes or even an 
under-class. In today's world, if you want to rise socially, you have to repress what-
ever violent inclinations you might cherish. Cultures of violence are associated with 
outsider groups, which appears from, among others, studies of New York in the 
1950s and contemporary towns in America and the Netherlands54. The reality of the 
process of pacification of the elites, for once, is attested by Elias' stern critics 
together. Schuster shows that the patriciate of Konstanz eagerly partook of the 
town's violence in the fifteenth century. For eighteenth-century Paris, Dinges points 
out that, whereas middle groups still indulged in physical confrontations, the upper 
groups were uninvolved. Schwerhoff admits to the social marginalization of vio-
lence in Germany, explaining that its practice was largely confined to the working 
classes by the second half of the nineteenth century55. 
The persistence of a relative marginalization of physical aggression, despite the 
rise in homicide rates in recent decades, attests to the fact that we have not simply 
returned today to an earlier phase in the long-term development of interpersonal vio-
lence. At various levels, modern social circumstances co-determine the ways in 
which threats, fights and assaults manifest themselves in our world. This can be 
illustrated with a qualitative comparison. The comparison - preliminary as it must 
be within the confines of this essay - is between two groups who are relatively well-
researched : Amsterdam's popular duelists around 1700 and the «street-oriented» 
inhabitants of Philadelphia's inner city, mostly black, on the eve of the year 2000 5 6 . 
I will call them AM1700 and PH2000, respectively. The former are representative 
for a broader culture of violence in the preindustrial period, while several of the 
latter's characteristics may also apply to underprivileged groups in contemporary 
5 3
 Spierenburg in Spierenburg (1998, p. 24). 
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 Schneider (1999); Anderson (1999); van San (1998). 
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 Schuster (1995, p. 112); Dinges (1993, p. 384); Schwerhoff (1999, pp. 129-130). 
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 Amsterdam: Spierenburg (1998, chapter 4 & 2000, pp. 188-189); Philadelphia: Anderson (1999). 
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Europe. Although AM1700 and PH2000 share a culture of violence and a code of 
honor and male bravery, at least three crucial differences between them can be 
observed. 
One is obvious at first sight : the use of knives vs. a preference for guns. This dif-
ference of technology affects the psychology of the two groups. In a gun fight, the 
participants usually observe a measure of physical distance, in contrast to the more 
direct, skin-close confrontation of the bladed duel. More so than with shooting, han-
dling a knife involves the unleashing of aggressive impulses. Paradoxically, those 
aggressive impulses do not necessarily imply a drive to kill. Knife fighters wanted 
to teach their opponent a lesson; if the fight ended in death, they considered this an 
accident. With a bullet, it is nearly impossible to « hurt someone just a little bit». The 
middle road between backing off and a deadly fight hardly exists. Consequently, to 
cultivate and exhibit a reputation for violence functions as a strategy of survival : 
this reputation alone frightens off challengers. For PH2000, unlike for AM1700, 
every armed confrontation is potentially lethal. 
A second difference has to do with modern developments, such as the commu-
nications revolution, the rise of consumerism and globalization, all of which had not 
set in yet by 1700. Despite the underprivileged conditions, modern media, in partic-
ular television, are present in today's inner cities. As a window on the world, televi-
sion makes PH2000 conscious of their position outside mainstream society. They 
hate «the system» and they ridicule and thwart any individual who seeks a future 
outside the ghetto. Such a form of political consciousness was totally absent in 
AM1700. Modern media also display the newest products. PH2000 have a taste for 
expensive trademark articles, which induces them to street robbery at times. This 
consumer-mentality hardly characterized AM1700. Yet, some of them engaged in 
property crime as well, in particular to facilitate their principal type of consumption : 
in taverns. Bars and similar establishments appear to be less central again in the life 
of PH2000, who literally have a street culture. 
Finally, the drug trade permeates modern street life. This is unequivocally a 
recent phenomenon, in America no less than in Europe. New York gangs of the 
1950s, for example, still were untouched by it. The very people who are habitually 
violent and cherish an ethos of bravery, are recruited into the illegal economy. 
Among PH2000, everyone with a «street» orientation gets involved in the drug 
trade (« going legal») sooner or later. This makes it possible for them to stay outside 
«the system» indeed. By contrast, AM1700 periodically shifted to a legal existence 
by enlisting on a ship. To the extent that the drug trade helps to sustain the culture of 
street violence, Western legislators, by prohibiting the consumption of certain sub-
stances, indirectly foster that culture. 
These observations, the beginning of a comparison which should be elaborated 
much more fully, are indicative. They point at crucial features of the context of vio-
lence which a straightforward count of dead bodies is unable to reveal. The differ-
ences between AM1700 and PH2000 illustrate still another aspect of Elias' theory. 
Elements of earlier phases of a long-term development, he observed, often remain 
present or return during later phases. However, they usually do so in a transformed 
manner, commensurate with the different type of society (or «figuration») which 
has emerged. 
Thus, the explanatory potential, for violence and other social phenomena, of the 
theory of civilization remains strong. That a few details in Elias' 1939 book have 
failed to stand the test of time was only to be expected. In no way do these minor 
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modifications add up to a falsification of his theory and, more important, they are 
heavily outweighed by new data compatible with this theory. For example, a re-
examination of the chronicles Elias indirectly relied on to picture medieval knights' 
love for battle and slaughter has made the notion of a warrior's lust for attacking 
uncertain, but this does hardly diminish the reality of violence in the everyday life 
of the period5 7. Similarly, although gender differences were a less prominent theme 
in Elias' 1939 book, he was one of the first theorists to include shifting power bal-
ances between the sexes among the principal modern trends58. Within the body of 
knowledge generated by Elias himself and the scholars who have elaborated his the-
ories, the triad of gender, power and violence looms large indeed. 
The basic argument of this essay can be summed up in a few sentences. Research 
on the long-term development of homicide over the last twenty years has yielded 
impressive new evidence for the theory of civilization. Some historians tend to 
ignore this evidence or attempt to explain it away. The only objection to the theory 
not based on a misinterpretation refers to the historical study of honor and ritual. 
However, in so far as they refer to this subject, Elias' critics merely proclaim its 
modernity, over the alleged «old-fashionedness» of his approach. In reality, the 
theory of civilization invites creative elaboration, in which subjects like ritual and 
honor are a boon rather than a problem. 
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